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THE REGULATION OF MOTOR CARRIERS IN
PENNSYLVANIA*
The history of transportation in Pennsylvania divides itself
into several periods, each period characterized by primary reliance
put upon some particular agency of transportation. First, there
were the roads, highways and turnpikes; then the period of
canals; next came the dominance of the railroads and street rail-
ways. And within recent years there is promise of a new period:
that of motor carriers operating as public carriers on a huge
scale, effecting a return of the highway to its former hegemony.
In the earliest period, reliance was placed primarily upon
bridle paths which followed the Indian trails, and which were
subsequently developed into wagon roads. The rivers were navi-
-gated only by small craft, and crossed by infrequent ferries and
bridges. During colonial times a few important roads, chiefly
military highways, were built, crossing the Alleghenies into the
wilderness, to Fort Duquesne.' The construction of important
turnpikes engaged the interest of Pennsylvania almost exclu-
sively from 1792 until 1822, the period culminating between 1830
and i84o. The first, the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike,
2
was immediately followed by over one hundred others. The coun-
try's most important early national road, the Cumberland Road,
was in reality a Pennsylvania road, since out of a total of 112
miles in its first section, 75 Y miles were in Pennsylvania. 3
*The material of the following article was collected in a comprehensive study
by the writers of public utility regulation in Pennsylvania as well as in other
states which will be published within the year.
'Braddock's Road was built in 1755; Forbes' Road in 1758.
2 This road, sixty-two miles in length, was completed in 1792.
'This highway, begun by the United States Government in 1811, extended
West from Cumberland through Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia to what
was later Wheeling, the first great artery to the West. It was extensively used
for commercial transportation, with lines of stage coaches and wagoners. The
cost of transportation, however, continued high in spite of this road, so that even
in 1817 it cost sioo.oo per ton to transport goods from Philadelphia to Pitts-
burgh; if the roads were good, a -stage coach could go from Philadelphia to
Pittsburgh, about 350 miles, in three days.
(696)
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Next came the canals. Pennsylvania was the first state to
undertake a comprehensive canal project. In 1762 a survey was
made for a canal to connect the Schuylkill and Susquehanna
Rivers, and in 1793 the legislature authorized the Conewago
Canal in York County, which was completed in 1797.4 Begin-
ning in i8z6 and continuing until i84o, when the work was
stopped by the success of the railroads, Pennsylvania was the
scene of extensive internal improvements, emphasizing canals and
the building of locks for canals. While the Erie Canal of New
York is more frequently heard of, the fact is that the Pennsyl-
vania Canal, from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, together with its
connecting rivers, was longer than the Erie Canal and cut through
more difficult country.
The impetus. toward railroads, which did not take long to
relegate the canals to a position of secondary importance, began
about I83o. The Philadelphia and Reading Railroad was char-
tered in 1833 and the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1846. There had,
before this time, been a few railroads in operation, but of a very
crude sort. Probably the first, a gravity road, was that operated
by the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company from Mauch
Chunk to its mines nine miles distant. The state itself built rail-
roads, such as that from Philadelphia to Columbia, and from
Hollidaysburg to Johnstown. Since large sums from the public
treasury had been put into the canal system, many citizens looked
with apprehension upon the progress of railroads. In 1831 the
Board of Canal Commissioners, to reassure these people, made
the following interesting statement:
"While the Board avow themselves favorable to rail-
roads where it is impracticable to construct canals, or under
some peculiar circumstances, yet they cannot forbear to ex-
plain their opinion that the advocates of railroads generally
have greatly overstated their commercial value. To counter-
act the wild speculations of visionary men and to allay the
honest fears and prejudices of many of our best citizens who
have been induced to believe that railroads are better than
'In 1791 it chartered the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation Company,
which later consolidated with other companies to become the Union Canal Com-
pany, with a total of io8 miles under operation.
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canals . . . the Canal Commissioners deemed it to be
their duty to state a few facts which would exhibit the com-
parative value of the two modes of improvement. . . . It.
will be found that canals are from two to two and one-half
times better than railroads for the purposes required of
them." r
By i85o railroad mileage in Pennsylvania had passed the thou-
sand mark, and from that time forward the leadership of the rail-
road was unquestioned. Pennsylvania is today one of the leading
railroad states of the union.
Along with these developments there was a very interesting
movement in municipal transportation. In the period of the '8o's
street railways were being developed and were entering into
competition with horse-drawn omnibus lines.6 It did not take
this newer method of carriage long to supersede the omnibus line
and shortly thereafter the motor vehicle appeared and threatened
the ascendency of the street railway. As early as 1903 we find
the following comment by a legal reporter:
"While omnibus lines have been almost entirely super-
seded on the streets of cities by street railways, it is possible
that the recent invention of horseless omnibuses propelled by
gasoline or electricity may make the subject of practical im-
portance in the near future." 7
True to this prediction, we did about a decade ago have the
sporadic jitney bus period and the commencing of the present
system of automobile carriage by motor bus and truck. It is
more than a century since the highway lost its supremacy to the
canal, the railroad and the street railway. It is interesting to ob-
serve that in the past five years, as a medium for the motor bus
and truck, it is returning to a place of outstanding importance in
the transportation system. Recent surveys indicate that the high-
ways of the country have already surpassed the railroad as a chief
'SWANK, PROGRESSIVE PENNSYLVANIA (1908) 158-159.
'For discussion of competition of omnibuses and street railways as an in-
sufficient reason for refusing to license a street railway under discretionary
power, see Comm. v. Baldwin, i4 Phila. 93 (I88o).
17 P. & L. Dig. Col. 29736.
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means of passenger transportation; 8 and the phenomenal build-
ing of improved highways in Pennsylvania has accelerated this
movement.9
The Pennsylvania Public Service Commission was one of the
first commissions in the country to assume wide regulatory powers
over motor carriers. Jurisdiction was assumed as early as 1914
under the act creating the body and giving it general power to
regulate common carriers and public utilities. 10 Most states, par-
ticularly during the last five years, have passed comprehensive
statutes delegating the power of regulation over motor carriers
to similar commissions and defining the rights and duties of mo-
tor carriers." Pennsylvania, however, has avoided such a new
act or amendment to its old act; its commission still regulates
motor carriers under the original law. Nowhere does this specifi-
cally mention motor carriers, but speaks entirely of common car-
riers and their obligations. Automobiles operating as common
carriers have been construed to fall within the definition of com-
mon carriers, have been required to obtain certificates of con-
venience and have been subjected to the appropriate regulative
features of the act.1
2
The term "public service company" is defined by Article I,
'See Henry R. Trumbower, Economics of Highway Transportation, 31
JOURNAL OF THE WESTERN SOCIETY OF ENGINEERS, NO. 4 (1926).
'Since 1917, and until July I, 1926, Pennsylvania completed I,188 miles of
highway with Federal Aid, at a total cost of $61,36o,15O.8O, of which the Fed-
eral government contributed $21,56o,732.04. A total of 597.2 miles are now un-
der construction and an additional 59 miles approved for construction with a
balance in the Federal Aid Fund of $286,788.42 available for new projects. From
7 PUBLIC ROADS, No. IO (Dec., 1926).
The facts relied upon in the foregoing are derived from the following:
SWANK, PROGRESSIVE PENNSYLVANIA (i908); TANNER, DESCRIPTION OF THE
CANALS AND RAILROADS OF THE UNITED STATES (840); MEYER & MAcGLL,
HISTORY OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE I86o; R INGWALT,
TRANSPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES (I888); 21 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITAN-
NICA i68.
" Act of I913, P. L. 1374, PA. STAT. (1920) § 18057.
'Lilienthal & Rosenbaum, Motor Carriers and the State: A Study in Con-
temporary Public Utility Legislation, 2 JOURNAL OF LAND AND PUBLIC UTILITY
EcONOMIcS 257.
" See cases discussed in the next section herein. Taxicabs have been held
common carriers, Connelly v. R. R., 53 Pa. Super. 78 (1913) ; Kerr v. R. R., 53
Pa. Super. 83 (1913). A taxicab has been held a "public conveyance provided
for passenger service, and propelled by gasoline" within the terms of an acci-
dent insurance policy. Primrose v. Casualty Co., 232 Pa. 210, 81 Atl. 212 (1911).
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Section i, as including "all common carriers," and this section
then proceeds to define common carrier as follows:
"The term 'common carrier,' as used in this act, in-
cludes any and all common carriers, whether corporations or
persons, engaged for profit in the conveyance of passengers
or property, or both, between points within this Common-
wealth, by, through, over, above, or under land or water, or
both."
And Article III, Section 2 (b), requires the approval of the
Commission, as evidenced by a certificate of public convenience,
for any public service company "to begin the exercise of any
right, power, franchise or privilege in any ordinance, mu-
nicipal contract, or otherwise." Construing these two sections
together, the Commission has held that before a common carrier
can lawfully operate motor cars over the roads of Pennsylvania,
it must obtain a certificate of public convenience from the Com-
mission.13 Of course, by the same reasoning motor carriers are
subjected to all the other duties and obligations and are entitled
to all the rights set forth in the act applicable to their operation:
for example, they must, under Article III, Section 2 (a), obtain a
certificate of public convenience for their incorporation, 14 and
they are subject to rate regulation by the Commission.15
It is clear that under the act, the Commission has jurisdiction
over only common, and not private carriers. Accordingly, it has
been held that a foreign corporation authorized by its charter to
engage in a common carriage may register in Pennsylvania for
the purpose of engaging in private carriage alone and need not
obtain the approval of the Commission for such operation.' 6
" Scranton R. R. v. Walsh, C. D. 441 (I915), II Pa. P. S. C. R. 262; Huff-
man et al. v. .Rue, C. D. 5788 (1924), VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 682; Fullington Auto
Bus v. Hugh Milligan et al., C. D. 2875 (1918), IV Pa. P. S. C. R. 76.
"Fagen et al4 v. Pitts. Traction Co., C.,D. 2849 (I918), III Pa. P. S. C.
R. 65. See RuLEs OF PRACtiCE BEFORE PA. P. S. C. (1914), Rule 24, for state-
ment of corporate purposes required for -issuance of certificate approving in-
corporation of taxicab companies and auto transportation companies.
" See, for example, In re John M. Drew, A. D. 3405 (I92i), V Pa. P. S.
C. R. 311.
" Application of Philadelphia and N. Y. Transportation Co., A. D. 9734
(1924), VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 8o8.
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However, it is not always a simple matter to determine if a par-
ticufar motor carrier is a common carrier or not. The test itself
of common carriage is simple enough-a carrier holding itself
out to serve any member of the public for compensation-but in
the many complex situations that arise it is often debatable if
there is a "holding out."
A review of the cases passed on by the Commission and the
courts is enlightening. 17  In Howard v. Public Service Commis-
sion, a motor car used to convey daily employees of a factory
from a borough to and from the factory, which factory was lo-
cated near one of its termini, and collecting equal fares from all
of those who presented themselves, was held to be a common
carrier. 18 And in Spontak v. Public Service Commission,19 an
operator used a taxicab between certain towns, making five or
six trips a day at a uniform charge and carrying all up to the
limit of its ,capacity. Despite the fact that he did not operate
constantly, he was held a common carrier. Similarly, where
there was evidence that an operator used a taxicab in soliciting
passengers at a railroad station and gave receipts for money paid
as "taxi service" and "fares," the Commission's finding that he
was operating as a common carrier was sustained.20 Again, in the
case of an operator who kept his two vehicles standing in the
street near a railway station, accepting for carriage all persons
who applied, and who in this way filled his cars even if he had
previously arranged to meet a particular party, there was held
evidence sufficient to warrant a finding of common carriage. 2'
Other types of common carriers regulated are automobiles used
" Taxicabs as common carriers, Connelly v. R. R., and Kerr v. R. R., supra
note 12. Moving vans as common carriers, Lloyd v. Hough & Keenan Storage
& Transfer Co., 223 Pa. x48, 72 Atl. 516 (i9o9).
is77 Pa. Super. 188 (1921). For a similar case where the carrier purported
to have "regular" customers, see Kendig v. Schwartz, C. D. 5728 (1923), VI
Pa. P. S. C. PL 569; Wayne Transp. Co. v. Leopold, C. D. 5822, 5823 (1923),
VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 575.
" 73 Pa. Super. 219 (igig).
"Adams v. P. S. C., 77 Pa. Super. 381 (1921).
"Domiani v. P. S. C., 73 Pa. Super. 37 (919).
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on tourists' trips or sightseeing tours, 22 and cars engaged in jitney
service.
2 3
In order to make out a case of common carriage, there
must be operation of the vehicle as a business and for hire. If no
compensation is paid for the service, there can be no common
carriage. Thus in Shaw v. Smitl, 24 where several owners of
automobiles agreed among themselves to alternate weekly in the
use of a car of one of their number to take them to and from
work, and made no charge or division of expense, there was held
to be no common carriage. Likewise, operation under a private
contract without any holding out to the public would prevent a
carrier from being classified as a public carrier. Service limited
to funerals, weddings and similar occasions are illustrations.25
Transportation of children under contract with school authori-
ties is private carriage and not within the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission.2 6 However the mere fact of having a private contract
can not be used as an excuse to convert one who is in reality a
public carrier into a private one 2 7 and so, if all the elements of
common carriage are present,-the mere existence of such a con-
tract does not change the status of a carrier.28 Nor will the subter-
fuges employed at times by so-called "community buses" which
'In re Application of the Alvin R. Bush, A. D. 11304 (924), Pa. P. S.
C., No. 1499; Plank v. Gilbert, C. D. 5311 (923), VI P. S. C. R. 183 (Guide on
Gettysburg Battlefield).
"Scranton R. R. v. Walsh, supra note 13; So. Pa. Traction Co. v. Kane,
C. D. 3825 (92), V Pa. P. S. C. R. 76.
'C. D. 6229 through 6o41 (924), Pa. P. S. C. No. 1481.
"Halperin v. P. S. C., 81 Pa. Super. 591 (1923) ; Application of Win. H.
Jones, A. D. 9o66 (923), VI P. S. C. R. 549; see Application of Philadelphia
R. & Co., C. D. 3112 (925), Pa. P. S. C. No. 1589.
' Huffman v. Rue, supra note 13.
27 Wayne Transportation Co. v. Leopold, and Kendig v. Schwartz, supra
note 18.
" Wilkes.-Barre Ry. v. Hartman, C. D. 6434 (925), Pa. P. S. C. No.
1551. In this case it was held that bus service rendered to the employees of an
industry daily, for which the employees paid seven cents a ride, is not divested
of its character as a common carrier by the acceptance of an agreement or lease
made with the manager of the mill for the daily operation of the buses. Fur-
ther, where a motor carrier, besides transporting goods under a contract, does
hauling for others, he is rendered thereby a common carrier, e. g., a motor car-
rier who transports goods under a. contract with an association composed of
forty-four members and besides does hauling for others. Buffalo and Lake Erie
Tractiof Co. v. Henneous, C. D. 5712 (1923), VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 584; Henneous
v. Henneous, C. D. 5556 (1923), VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 505.
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purport to operate for the benefit of some community and accept
fare in the guise of "contributions," or make a "gift" of tickets
on the payment of a certain sum, remove operation, otherwise
common carriage, from that classification.
29
In certain instances the finding of the Commission that a
carrier was operating as a common carrier has been reversed by
the court. Such has been the case where the only evidence that
the defendant was operating as a common carrier was that people
had sometimes paid for being carried in his auto; but defendant
had not stood in the street, had not solicited patronage, nor held
himself out for transportation of the public.30 And again the
finding of the Commission has been reversed where the only
testimony was that of the complainant who saw the defendant
take passengers in his auto between certain towns, take money
and solicit return passengers, but did not know whether the origi-
nal passengers were solicited or specially contracted with,
whether a regular fare was charged, and whether return passen-
gers were ever actually carried.m In Ramsey & Johnson v. Pub-
lic Service Commission,a4 where it appeared that the owner of a
vehicle had not actually operated it himself, but some other per-
son, not under his authority or in his employ, had done so, the or-
der of the Commission directed against the owner was reversed.
The jurisdiction of the Commission has been extended to
motor carriers operating whether over regular or irregular
routes, or between definite or indefinite termini. The phrase in
Article I, Section i, of the Act, limiting jurisdiction of the Com-
mission to common carriage "between points within this Com-
monwealth," is held not to limit the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion to motor service rendered along definite routes and between
designated points.3-. And further, it is given control over both
'Lehigh Valley Transit Co. v. Bander et al., C. D. 480 (192I), V Pa. P. S.
C. R. 309; York Ry. v. Longstreet, C. D. 5833 (924), VI Pa. P. S. C. R.
711.
" Ramsey & Johnson v. P. S. C., 73 Pa. Super. 215 (1919).
31Toth v. P. S. C., 73 Pa. Super. 217 (1919). But held otherwise where
these facts were proved: Piercely v. P. S. C., 73 Pa. Super. 212 (1919).
"Supra note 3o. See also, Smith v. P. S. C., 73 Pa. Super. 209 (1919).
So. Pa. Traction Co. v. Kane, supra note 23.
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intercity motor operation and operation entirely within the limits
of a municipality. It has exclusive power to issue certificates of
public convenience and necessity and to determine that there shall
or shall not be operation within a municipality, and, therefore,
power to issue a certificate without requiring the applicant to se-
cure a franchise or consent for operation from a municipality in
which it is to operate. The power to prohibit service which is
necessary for the public convenience rests solely with the Com-
mission. It is a matter over which municipalities have no con-
trol.-
Nevertheless municipalities still have a large measure of con-
trol over motor carriage. By acts of 1913, 1915 and 1925, they
have been given power to regulate, license, prescribe rates for, and
designate streets for operation of motor vehicles operating
"within the limits of the city or from points in the city to points
beyond the city limits." 3' The power of municipalities to regu-
" Collins v. P. S. C., 84 Pa. Super. 58 (1924), aff'g Application of Chester
Auto Line, A. D. 7522 (1923), VI P. S. C. R. 477. In this case, the com-
mission refused to issue a certificate to a second carrier to operate. over a line
already certified, even though the first holder had failed at the time to receive
the consent of the municipality and the second carrier bad obtained such consent.
In It re Lehigh Valley Transportation Company, A. D. 11967 (1925), Pa.
P. S. C. No. 1520, the Commission refused to qualify a certificate issued for the
incorporation of a bus line within a municipality so as to give the municipality
"regulatory supervision" over the line. The request was apparently for com-
plete control, rather than merely regulatory power which it already had.
The phrase "within the Commonwealth" in Article I, Section i of the Act
was evidently used to distinguish between intrastate and interstate rather than
to limit the jurisdiction of the Commission to intercity operation. Scranton R.
R. v. Fiorussi, 66 Pa. Super. 475 (917).
"Act of 1915, P. L. 685 § I,. PA. STAT. (1920) § 2971: "Each city may
regulate the transportation by motor vehicles (not operated on tracks) of pas-
sengers or property, for pay, within the limits of the city, or from points in the
city to points beyond the limits of the city. In such regulation the city may im-
pose reasonable license fees, make regulations for the operation of vehicles, the
rates to be charged for transportation and may designate certain streets upon
which such vehicles, if operated, must be operated."
Municipalities of the third class have the following power under Act of
1913, P. L. 568, Art. V, § 3, Cl. 27, PA. STAT. (1920) § 4214: "Cities of the third
class are authorized to establish stands for coaches, cabs, omnibuses, car-
riages, wagons, automobiles, and other vehicles for hire, and to enforce the ob-
servance and use thereof; and to fix the rites and prices for transportation of
persons and property from one part of the city to another."
Municipalities of the third class are empowered to establish stands and fix
rates for vehicles for hire within the city limits, under Act of 1913, P. L. 568,
Art. V, § 3, PA. STAT. (1920) § 4214. And under Act of 1925, P. L. 254 § 28,
PA. STAT. SUPP. (1925) § 993, they can establish safety zones, parking hours,
etc., and can designate certain streets upon which such vehicles may operate,
with power to impose penalties for violations of such regulations.
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late traffic,26 to require bonds for loss of life or injury to person
or property,37 and to license vehicles and drivers,3 is obvious, al-
though there are certain limitations on this power. "Regulation
is not to be carried to the extent of prohibition." 39 The regula-
tions cannot be inconsistent with the direct provisions of the Mo-
tor Vehicle Law,40 and they cannot be unreasonable or discrimi-
natory.
41
True it is that the.statutory powers delegated to municipali-
ties and those delegated to the Commission are not inconsistent
so as to effect a repeal by implication.4 2 But which is predomi-
nant, if municipality and Commission should attempt to regulate
certain carriers in inconsistent manners within the broad field
None of these acts, however, provide expressly for municipal regulation
of carriers operating through a municipality from one point outside it to another
point also outside. There should, however, be little difficulty in interpreting the
words of the acts to include operation to, from, and through a municipality.
.City of Easton v. Miller, 265 Pa. 25, io8 Atl. 262 (igig), (routing of
street railways).
'Jitney Bus Ass'n of Wilkes-Barre v. Wilkes-Barre, 256 Pa. 462, ioo Atl.
954 (1917).
. Brazier v. Phila., 215 Pa. 297, 64 Atl. 5o8 (igo6). In this case it was
held that state provisions on the same subject do not deprive municipalities of
the power to license vehicles and drivers.
'9 Jitney Bus Ass'n of Wilkes-Barre v. Wilkes-Barre, supra note 37. See
also, Collins v. P. S. C., supra note 34.
,o See note 35 supra. The following sections in PA. STAT. (i92o) and sup-
plements thereto include all state enactments concerning motor vehicles: §§ 964
through io2o; 2971: 4214; 7683; 11461; 11462; 13289; 19043; I9o43a; 19o50;
29636; Act of February 19, 1926, P. L. I6 § 5; Act of February r9, 1926, P. L.
27 § I.
'An ordinance requiring bonds of jitneys for damage by loss of life or
injury to persons or property was held unreasonable in requiring a surety com-
pany to sign, imposing liability on the surety even after recovery of a loss
against him, and requiring the carrying of firemen and policemen free under cer-
tain conditions. Jitney Bus Ass'n of Wilkes-Barre v. Wilkes-Barre, supra
note 37. "The general regulations which it adopts must be reasonable, not unduly
burdensome, and they must be uniformly applicable to all who operate under
like conditions." Collins v. P. S. C., supra note 34.
"The Act of June i, -195, giving municipalities power over motor vehicles
is not inconsistent with and does not repeal the Public Service Company Law.
Scranton RZ. R. v. Fiorussi, supra note 34; So. Pa. Traction Co. v. Kane, supra
note 23. To the effect that the Public Service Company Law does not deprive
municipalities of the power to regulate traffic on the streets so far at least as
street railways are concerned, see City of Easton v. Miller, supra note 36. De-
spite the power of the commission to issue certificates of public convenience for
the operation of motor buses over roads which embrace an inter-county bridge,
the authorities charged with the care of the highways may close them tempo-
rarily to make repairs on the bridge without the permission of the commission.
Miller v. Johnson, 30 Pa. D. R. 359 (192).
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wherein both have been delegated power? In Setzer v. City of
Pottsville,43 the Commission issued a certificate of public conveni-
ence authorizing a motor bus line to operate between two munici-
palities including a designated route within the limits of one of
them. Subsequent to the granting of the certificate the latter
municipality passed an ordinance designating the streets on which
interurban buses could operate and forbidding operation on other
streets. Under the terms of the ordinance the bus line would
have been forced to change the route specified in its certificate.
The operator sought to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance, but
this relief was denied him. It was contended that, under the
Public Service Company Law of 1913, the authority of the Com-
mission was superior to any ordinance the municipality might
pass in contravention thereof. But the court pointed to the Act
of 19.5,44 which delegated to the city the right to impose license
fees, make regulations, fix rates and designate streets upon which
vehicles could operate. It said that because this statute was en-
acted subsequent to the Public Service Company Law it would
repeal that law in so far as it would be in conflict therewith. It
said, however, that the two acts could very well be construed to-
gether. Justice Porter in his opinion said:
"No individual or company has the right to operate, as
a common carrier, a motor vehicle for the transportation of
persons or property, without first obtaining from the Public
Service Commission a certificate of public convenience, but
the authority to designate the routes over which such motor
vehicles shall operate is by Act of 1915 vested in the city.
The Public Service Company Law did not make the munici-
palities public service companies, and cities and boroughs,
acting strictly as such, are unaffected by it in the exercise of
their functions and powers and in the performance of their
municipal duties. . . . The Act of 1915 conferred upon
cities'power to pass ordinances of a specific and defined
character, to 'designate certain ,streets upon which such ve-
hicles, if operated, must be operated.' When the legislative
grant is of this specific character an ordinance passed pur-
suant thereto cannot be impeached as invalid because it
873 Pa. Super. 573 (1920).
"Act of 1915, P. L. 685, PA. STAT. (1920) § 2971.
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would have been regarded as unreasonable if passed under
the incidental power of the municipality, or under a grant
of power general in its nature."
This opinion might be construed to mean that the general
regulatory powers of the Commission terminate at the limits of
the municipality. Such an' interpretation would, however, be
disastrous to the state-wide control of motor buses by the Com-
mission. It would seem that in such matters as fixation of fares,
prescribing rates, requirements of equipment and the like, a mu-
nicipal ordinance is superior to the order of the Commission in so
far as operation within the municipality is concerned. The Com-
mission, however, should be construed to still have power within
the municipal limits so long as the exercise thereof does not con-
flict with proper, municipal requirements. And further, there
should be a limitation on the regulatory power of the municipal-
ity. It should not be permitted to exercise its regulatory func-
tions in such a manner as to unreasonably impede the operation
of motor carriers certified by the Commission. In such a way,
there may be effected a compromise between the exercise of regu-
latory power by the municipality and the state agency. A similar
adjustment has been arrived at in Ohio which had a somewhat
more difficult problem of construing a "home rule" provision of
its constitution and a statute delegating power to its public utility
commission.45
Article III, Section 2 (b), of the Public Service Company
Law, which makes it unlawful for any motor carrier, with-
out first obtaining a certificate from the Commission, "to begin
" Perrysville et al. v. Ridgeway et al., io8 Ohio 245, 14o N. E. 595 (1923) ;
Murphy v. City of Toledo, io8 Ohio 342, 14o N. E. 626 (1923) ; Lorrain Street
Railway v. Public Utility Commission, H13 Ohio 68, 148 N. E. 577 (1925);
City of Nelsonville v. Ramsey et al., i13 Ohio 217, 148 N. E. 694 (1925).
if the municipality does not interfere with the general powers of
the Public Utilities Commission, it may, by suitable police regulations, .control,
direct, and manage its streets, and the traffic thereon, and the conclusion reached
is that their ordinances are not an unreasonable local police regulation relating
to traffic, reciting as they do that it is intended to make the streets less con-
gested and less dangerous to pedestrians and the public generally, and may be so
enforced as not to materially lessen the efficiency of the utility. Of course,
under the guise of so regulating traffic, a city may not materially interfere with
the general efficiency of the utility authorized by the Public Utilities Commis-
sion within its jurisdiction." Lorrain Street Ry. v. P. U. C., supra at 69.
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the exercise of any right, power, franchise or privilege . .
has been construed to extend the regulatory powers of the Com-
mission only over motor carriers starting operation after the
effective date of the Act. Motor carriers engaged in lawful opera-
tion prior to January i, 1914, need not obtain a certificate from
the Commission.47 The effect of such a construction is to read
into the act a "grandfather clause," such as is found in the laws
of many of the states and which permits operation of existing
motor carriers upon obtaining a certificate issued as a matter of
right upon affidavit. Under the Pennsylvania Act, however,
motor carriers which were operating prior to passage of the Act
are entirely exempt from the necessity of obtaining certificates.
Operation by a motor carrier prior to the effective date of the Act
confers on such carrier only the right to operate in the same class
of service engaged in prior to the Act.48  In an early case it was
held that such a prior operating carrier need not obtain the per-
mission of the Commission to increase his business by adding
buses or extending routes.49 There seems, however, to be no basis
for such a holding. A carrier who wishes to extend his route or
increase his service is to all intents and purposes in the same posi-
tion as a carrier who wishes to commence operation and should
be required to obtain a certificate for the increase of business.
Such has been the holding of later cases decided by the Commis-
sion.50 Its general regulatory powers, other than the issuance of
41 Supra note 40. Article IV, § 12 of the Law reads: "Every public service
company shall be entitled to the full enjoyment -and exercise of all and every
right, power and privilege which it lawfully possesses, or might possess, at the
time of the passage of this act, except as herein otherwise expressly pro-
vided. .. '
"Wilkes-Barre Ry. v. Pugh, C. D. 592 (i918), III Pa. P. S. C. R. 292;
Same v. Hartman, supra note 28.
4 Wilkes-Barre Ry. v. Hartman, supra note 28; Henneous v. Flaugh &
Flaugh, C. D. 5841 (924), VI P. S. C. R. 788.
"Wilkes-Barre Ry. v. Pugh, supra note 47.
'Wilkes-Barre Ry. v. Hartman, C. D. 5389 (1923), VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 362;
The Emerick Motor Bus Line v. Harry Danet al., C. D. 5267 et al. (1923), VI
Pa. P. S. C. R. 312; Wilkes-Barre Ry. v. Hartman, supra note 28; In re Applica-
tion of G. A. Lageman, A. D. 5726 et al.- (1922), V Pa. P. S. C. R. 849. The
commission allowed certain certificates to issue, but stated "it must not be under-
stood that we are giving assent to the contention that an applicant can tack his
service to that of his predecessors and thereby establish a continuous service ante-
dating the enactment of the Public Service Company Law, and thus exempt him
from its provisions."
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certificates, also apply to motor carriers in operation prior to the
effective date of the ActY
1
Prior to the recent United States Supreme Court decisions
denying the right of the state to withhold a certificate of conveni-
ence from a motor carrier operating in interstate commerce,52 the
Pennsylvania Commission had required interstate motor carriers
to apply for certificates.5 ' It was felt that, since motor trans-
portation was principally over short routes, it was local in its
nature, falling within the class of interstate comme-ce which
might more properly be left to the regulatory control of the state,
and, in the absence of federal legislation, might be regulated by
the state. But after the pronouncements of the United States
Supreme Court in the Buck and Duke cases, 54 the Commission
completely reversed itself and held that it had no jurisdiction to
require motor carriers engaged exclusively in interstate com-
merce to obtain a certificate.5 5 It probably went too far in this
volte face; it could have continued to issue certificates provided it
denied none to interstate carriers because their operation was in-
consistent with public convenience and necessity. It would then
be easier for it to exercise the "police" jurisdiction which it still
' The Emerick Motor Bus Line, Inc., v. Dan, supra note 50. "The Com-
mission may refuse to issue a certificate or it may limit the number of certifi-
cates granted as it deems to be just and proper. It may also restrict within
reasonable limits the territory in which certificate holders shall operate. We are
of the opinion that these principles attached to common carriers who were
operating before the enactment of the Public Service Company Law as well as
to those who have applied for and been granted certificates of public convenience
since the effective date of our organic act. The public accommodation and con-
venience are the ends to be attained and the service, whether rendered under the
exemption of the law or under the authority of a certificate of public conveni-
ence, is to be supervised and regulated by the Commission so as to best meet
those ends."
Infra note 54.
Chambersburg, Greencastle, etc., Co. v. Hardman, C. D. 3778 (921), V
Pa. P. S. C. R. 58; So. Pa. Traction Co. v. Kane, Jr., supra note 23; Applica-
tion of Solt, A. D. IO2O9 (1924), VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 786; Application of Phil-
lips et al., A. D. 7805 et al. (1924), VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 825.
" Michigan Public Utility Co. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570 (1925) ; Buck v. Kuy-
kendall, 267 U. S. 307 0925).
"In re Application of E. H. Scott Transportation Co., A. D. I515 (925),
P. S. C. No. 1536; Pa. R. R. v. East Coast Coach Co., C. D. 6367 (I925), P.
S. C. No. 1543.
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retains over interstate carriers, such as definition of routes, limita-
tion of speed and regulation of equipment.50
In issuing a certificate for the operation of a motor carrier
the Commission must find that the public convenience requires its
operation or incorporation, and that the granting of an applica-
tion of a certificate "is necessary or proper for the service, ac-
commodation, convenience, or safety of the public." 57 A certain
well-defined practice has sprung up in such determinations.58
The Commission has repeatedly held that where existing facili-
ties are adequate and serve the needs of the public and the addi-
tion of motor transportation facilities would cause interference
with the operation of established carriers, no certificate should is-
sue. Many of the cases have involved jitneys or motor bus routes
wishing to operate in direct competition with established street
railways. The commission has consistently refused to approve
such applications for a certificate. 59 Where, however, the pur-
For a discussion of the power of the state over intrastate motor carriage,see Rosenbaum & Lilienthal, Motor Carrier. Regulation: Federal, State andMunicipal, 26 COLUMBIA L. REv. 954 (1926). The requirement of vehicle regis-tration and driver license applies to interstate carriers. See note 94 infra. For
a recent case discussing the power of the state to require a tax on interstate mo-
tor carriers according to mileage within the state see Interstate Busses Corpora-
tion v. Blodgett, U. S. Dist. Ct. of Conn., decided January, 1927.
' Article V, § 18, P. S. C. Law, supra note io.
"For a general discussion of the law involving the issuance of certificates ofconvenience and necessity, see Lillienthal and Rosenbaum, Motor Carrier Regu-lation by Certificates of Necessity and Convenience, 36 Yale L. J. 163 (1926).
"In re Application of Samuel Leysock et al., A. D. 3633 through 3637
(92o), IV Pa. P. S. C. R. 809; In re Application of the Commonwealth Trans-portation Company, A. D. 3270 (1920), IV Pa. P. S. C. R. 578: "The time maycome, although not now apparent, when auto-bus service will be substituted forthe service now furnished by the street railways, but the Commission is far
from being convinced that the public is ready to accept the change or to chooseauto-bus as the better agent of the two to most efficiently and conveniently servethem. The Commission is convinced, however, that the public can not for longhave both services under the facts and circumstances disclosed in this case."
Southern Ohio Traction Co. v. Hartel, C. D. 1163, A. D. 699 (1916), 11 Pa. P.S. C. R. 937: "Auto-buses can be made a convenient method of transportation
and would accommodate the public in many cases. It would be useful where
there is no trolley operated or where it can be made an auxiliary of a trolleysystem." In this case a certificate was denied. Houser, Trading as ButlerTransfer Co., A. D. 4183 (1920), V Pa. P. S. C. R. 122; Application of Scott, A.D. 5788 (1922), VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 577; Application of Roth, A. D. 7465 (922),
VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 236; Application of The Erie Motor Transit Co., A. D. 3831(1920), V Pa. P. S. C. R. 9. Competition with interurbans: Applications of
George R. Houser, A. D. 5io8 (I921), V Pa. P. S. C. R. 594; Application ofThomas H. Quinn, A. D. 5588 (1921), V Pa. P. S. C. R. 666; Application of
R. F. Budinger, A. D. 5483 (1921), V Pa. P. S. C. R. 731.
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pose of the company is to render service auxiliary or supplemen-
tary to an existing street railway or railroad the certificate is ordi-
narily issued.60 The Commission's preference toward issuing a
certificate to an established railway carrier for the operation of
motor vehicles does not, however, apply where the route in ques-
tion is not auxiliary or complementary to the railway service; and
particularly where another motor carrier is already operating
over the route in an efficient manner. 61
The policy of refusing to permit motor carrier competition
to place existing carriers at an undue disadvantage applies to pas-
senger 62 and freight service by railroad. 63  The Commission,
6In re Application of Lehigh Valley Transportation Co., A. D. 11967
(1925), Pa. P. S. C. No. 1520; In re Application of Wyoming Valley Auto-Bus
Co., A. D. 7905 (1925), Pa. P. S. C. No. 1513; In re Application of Lawrence
C. Hartman, A. D. 11368 (925), Pa. P. S. C. No. 1513; Application of Scott,
A. D. 1o209 (1924),' VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 786, where an applicant first was re-
fused a certificate to carry freight by motor truck because of competition with
a railway company and later entered into a contract with the same company to
supplement their service with his motor trucks, a certificate thereupon issued;
Applications of George J. Rutledge et aL., A. D. 7746, 9364, 9545, 9703, 10095
(1924), VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 82o; Application of the Lehigh Transportation Co.,
A. D. 11967 (1925), Pa. P. S. C. No. 152o. Auto-bus service by a subsidiary
corporation of a street railway system is preferable to "transitory and un-
stable" jitney service of a large number of operators: Application of The So.
Pa. Bus Co., A. D. 672o (1922), V Pa. P. S. C. R. 93o.
' Application of Ely, A. D. 11769 (1925), P. S. C. No. 1512.
Application of John A. Allio and George F. Allio Co., partners, A. D. 7941
(1923), VI Pa. P.'S. C. R. 463; In re Application of Howard V. Brown, A. D.
11793 (1925), Pa. P. S. C. R. 15z8; Application of Anderson Hardware Bus Line,
A. D. 75o6-1922 (1923), VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 184, 187, 188. "It may be that the
time will come when auto buses can take the place of rail carriers, but cer-
tainly that will not be until the financial ability, stability and permanency of
auto bus companies are more fully assured than at the present." Application of
John A. Allio, supra. In Application of Roy Welker, A. D. 7121-22 (1922), VI
Pa. P. S. C. R. 134, a certificate was denied a motor carrier which wished to
establish "through service" even though service between some of the intervening
points might afford public convenience.
'Application of Eichelberger, A. D. 4524 (1921), V Pa. P. S. C. R. 303;
Appri~ation of Bingaman Motor Express Co., A. D. 9o92 (924), VI Pa. P. S.
C. R. 65o, 652, 653: "It has been the policy of the Commission to refuse to per-
mit c6mpetition with existing utilities which have large investments and are
necessary for public convenience, if their service is or can be made reasonably
adequate. No transportation agency can render perfect service at all times to
all persons. The Commission must consider the benefit to the general public.
The use of motor trucks for transporting property has reduced considerably the
receipts of railroad and electric railvay companies. Although such- motor serv-
ice may be more convenient to some shippers than service by electric railway or
railroad, consideration of public convenience will not permit the Commission to
take action which will endanger the continued financial stability of such estab-
lished roads."
Application of G. A. Lageman, supra note 5o: "It may be conceded
that these wagon and truck carriers of property furnish a more adequate and
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however, will consider the reasonableness of competition by auto-
mobile with rail carriers according to the facts in each case,64 and
since it is not not the object of the public utility law to establish a
monopoly, but rather to see that no ultimate injury is practiced
upon the public by unrestricted competition, the courts will not
hold the Commission to a rigid rule. 5 The issuance of a certifi-
cate to a motor carrier paralleling a traction company where
operation would not seriously affect the finances of the traction
company, would relieve the rush hours and might better serve
certain persons, was upheld.66 Similarly, if a railroad does not
more convenient local service of a limited character than is furnished by either
the railroads or the express company protesting their application. But this does
not warrant the establishment of a competitive situation in isolated localities
which threatens the existence of not only a State, but a Nation-wide transporta-
tion system which either is or can be made to furnish reasonably adequate and
convenient service."
M. I. O'Boyle & Henry W. Knowlton, A. D. 9238-9239 (1923), VI
Pa. P. S. C. R. 555; Application of Springer & Wolf, A. D. 9o16 (1923), VI Pa.
P. S. C. R. 525: "While there is undoubtedly a growing place for auto-truck
service in transportation fields, the Commission is firmly of the opinion that such
a place is not to be found in long distance hauling in destructive competition
with established rail carriers. . . . Nevertheless the allegations made are
fairly illustrative of some of the conditions encountered in submitting the pub-
lic to service relations with irresponsible auto-truck operators."
Application of Scott, supra note 59 at 579: "There is ample room for
a remunerative auto-bus and auto-truck service without entering into injurious
competition with an established trolley or steam road which is furnishing a rea-
sonably adequate service. By co-ordinating the two methods of transportation,
each carrier serving a field not already occupied by the other, both carriers, as
well as the public, would be benefited thereby."
Application of Philips, supra note 53: "Within the past decade, and more
particularly since the period of abnormal industrial expansion during the World
War, there has been a large development in the use of motor facilities for the
transportation of freight and express. The overstrain that was placed upon the
rail carriers during the war period, especially in the transportation of merchan-
dise between ports on the Atlantic Seaboard, brought into being a large number
of motor concerns transporting merchandise previously shipped by rail.
Motor trucks were the only available means by which they could adjust them-
selves to the new requirements of business. By the use of trucks the factories
were not only able to save crating and other shipping charges because uncrated
goods could be loaded at the factory door and delivered in like condition at the
store doors of consumers."
In re Application of Alvin R. Bush, supra note 22. The Commission al-
lowed an auto-bus and freight service to compete with railroads furnishing simi-
lar service where the business was established by wagon or motor truck for fifty
years: Application of G. A. Lageman, supra hote 5o.
'Pottsville Union Traction Co. v. P..S. C. (Mayer's Application), 67 Pa.
Super. 297 (1917) ; Same (Brady's Application), 67 Pa. Super. 304 (1917).
' Ibid. For a similar case where a certificate issued and the schedule of a
motor carrier was limited to times when a competing railroad did not operate
passenger trains, see Application of R. M. Kishback, A. D. 5645 (I92I), VI Pa.
P. S. C. R. 129.
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furnish adequate service,17 or is unable to furnish the particular
service contemplated by the motor carrier, such as the collection
and transportation of milk and dairy products, a certificate will
be granted to a competing motor carrier.68 In one case, a certifi-
cate of convenience was issued to a motor bus company to operate
in competition with a steam railroad where the public would be
greatly accommodated thereby; but the schedule was so arranged
as to prevent competition with scheduled passenger service.69
The existence of motor carrier facilities on a route applied
for is a factor to be considered where application is made for the
issuance of another certificate for that same route. If the pro-
testant to the issuance of a certificate is a motor carrier who, in
operating over the route, has violated the rules of the Commission
or failed to furnish adequate service, the existence of his opera-
tion will be given little weight in judging public convenience.
7 0
On the other hand, the Commission has said that where a territory
is adequately served by existing motor carriers, it will not create
a more intensive competition by allowing another motor carrier
to enter the field simply because the rates of existing companies
are too high, the manner of the operator discourteous, or service
otherwise unsatisfactory. Appropriate relief may be had by seek-
ing by proper action cancellation of the certificate or correction of
the faulty condition.7 ' But where it appears from the evidence
"In re Application of Fred X. Bowman, A. D. Io325 (1925), P. S. C. No.
1523.
'Application of Wilbert H. Hamilton, A. D. 4578 (ig2r), V Pa. P. S. C.
R- 304. Application of D. M. Pearce, A. D. 7172 (1922), VI Pa. P. S. C. R.
127. In Application of Bingamarq Motor Express Co., supra note 63, a certifi-
cate was denied motor trucks operating in competition with railroads, but it was
suggested that a certificate would issue for the limited purpose of carrying silk
and silk products in the Reading district, because this service was not being ade-
quately handled by the railroads. In Application of D. M. Pearce, supra at 128,
it was said: "That a truck service would better accommodate and be more con-
venient for a few persons is not sufficient to disrupt an established and reason-
ably adequate and convenient general service which would be rendered less
efficient by such competition."
'Application of The Cambria Bus Co., A. D. 5902 (1922), V Pa. P. S-
C. R. 794. For a case where a certificate was allowed a bus company in com-
petition with a street railway, see Application of Montgomery Bus Co., A. D.
5493-21 (1922), V Pa. P. S. C. R. 643.
"'Lehigh Traction Co. v. Forley, C. D. 1592, A. D. 1433 (1917), III Pa. P.
S. C. 1?. 351.
r'Application of Jacob Schrier, A. D. 7424-1922 (923), VI Pa. P. S. C. R.
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that competitive service is necessary for the accommodation of
the public, the Commission will allow two companies to operate
over the same route, even though the competing companies may
suffer somewhat thereby.
7 2
Where several applicants are applying for the same route the
Commission may exercise its discretion and attempt to select the
carrier best equipped and best fitted to render service to the pub-
lic. 7 9 One of the numerous factors which may go to make one
applicant preferable to the other is that the one will furnish
through service in connection with another route operated by it,
while the other will serve only part of the through route and neces-
sitate the transferring from one vehicle to another.74
The policy of restricting competition, however, has not
been generally applied to motor carriers operating for call
and demand service. It has been felt that a certain amount
of competition between such carriers is advantageous to the pub-
lic. But a limit is reached even for such service, and where the
Commission has felt that the service was not adequately ren-
dered by the already authorized carriers for call and demand, it
has refused to issue added certificates.7 5
In judging the qualification of an applicant the Commission
must necessarily have wide discretion, which, however, must not
be abused. An applicant which has, by its testimony, disclosed
to the Commission "utter and- definite disregard for constituted
authority" has been denied a certificate.7 6  The Commission has
said that the fact that an applicant has continued to operate in de-
fiance of the law and an order of the Commission denying it a
certificate on a former application "might well raise question of
its fitness to a certificate." 77 An application will also be denied
" Red Arrow Bus Line v. Southern Pa. Bus Co., C. D. 6377 (1925), P. S. C.
No. 1526.
" Applitation of Rutledge, supra note 6o.
S
7 Application of Phillipsburg Motor Bus Co. et aL, A. D. 9222, 9329 (1924),
VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 641.
7In re Application of Penn. Taxi Co., A. D. 11910 (925), P. S. C. No.
1556; In re Application of the City of Chester et al., A. D. 12204 through 12334
(1925), P. S. C. No. 1533.
C7It re Application of Frank J. Enfield, A. D. 3303 (1920), IV Pa. P. S.
C.R. 623.
"Application of George R. Houser, supra note 59.
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where the Commisssion finds that the applicant is restricted by
his charter from the furnishing of the service applied for. Thus
where a taxicab company was restricted by its charter to the fur-
nishing of taxi service, the application by the company to render
group or party service was refused.78 The Commission has, how-
ever, asserted the power of making such amendments, as of
routes specified in a charter, without a formal amendment of the
charter, where the change is for the service, accommodation and
convenience of the public.t9
The power to issue certificates necessarily includes the power
to limit the character and amount of service rendered under them.
Otherwise, the attempted surveillance of the Commission over
conditions of traffic would be futile. If a certificate were a mere
unlimited permit allowing service of any kind or amount, then
there is no reason for the weighty considerations of public con-
venience and necessity in its issuance. There is no assurance that
the service originally needed to meet public convenience and
necessity will not, by curtailment thereof or by increase in the de-
mands of the community, be converted into public disadvantage.
The rules of the Commission prescribe that operation under a
certificate must be "limited to a route, when specified, and to the
number of cars, particularly to each automobile or auto bus desig-
nated in the certificate."8' 0 It often exercises this power by limit-
ing or conditioning a certificate. 8 ' It has limited its approval of
operation by designating points for operation and forbiddng serv-
"In re Application of Packard Auto Taxi Co., A. D. 7542 (1926), P. S.
C. No. 1682.
Application of Philadelphia Suburban Transit Co., A. D. 12181 (1926),
P. S. C. No. i666.
"' RULs AND REGULATIONS, referring to the issuance of certificates of pub-
lic convenience for taxi cabs, jitneys, auto-buses, etc., Pa. P. S. C. General
Order No. i8, Adopted October 21, 1921, Rule i. Applied in Harley v. Johns-
town & Dunlo Bus Co., C. D. 488o (1922), V Pa. P. S. C. R. 8o3. Rule 5
provides: "Persons holding such certificates shall not carry more passengers in
any car than the number specified for said car in the certificate."
'Application of John Beville, A. D. 7732 (1923), VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 210,
where service was limited to non-competitive territory. See dissenting opinion
of Commissioner Rilling at 213. Application of D. M. Pearce, supra note 68.
(Certificate limited to gathering up and delivering milk.)
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ice to intermediate points; 82 it has granted a certificate for opera-
tion between twoboroughs and denied the carrier the right to solicit
or carry local passengers within the limits of one of the
boroughs. 83  In the absence of limitation, however, a certificate
for operation between fixed termini, and through certain villages
authorizes the furnishing of service to the villages named in the
route.84 The Commission has also power to designate the class
of motor service the certificate holder shall render. Thus it may
limit a certificate to the furnishing of call and demand service,
and such limitation will prohibit the furnishing of schedule serv-
ice by the carrier.8 5
These certificates are valid for a limited time only. However,
there is ample provision for renewal upon the expiration of that
period. It is provided by the rules of the Commission that
"all certificates of public convenience issued for taxi-cabs,
jitneys, and similar common carriers, shall hereafter be is-
sued for a period not exceeding two years, from the follow-
ing day of issuance for calendar periods beginning June I
to be renewable upon application."""
This section undoubtedly applies to certificates of all types
of motor carriers. It limits their possible life to two years and
requires an application for a renewal at the end of such time. Or-
Applications of Flough and Henneous, 9370-9414 (1924), VI Pa. P. S. C.
R. 784. In this case, the contention was made that the Commission had simply
the power to issue general and unrestricted certificates, under which certificate
holders would have the right to operate between all points in a specified terri-
tory. It was said that the Commission did not have power to limit certificates to
service between designated terminal points. The contention was overruled.
3In re Application of E. R. Edwards et al., A. D. 2105 (1918), III Pa. P.
S. C. R. 924.
" Lehigh Traction Co. R. v. Collins, C. D. 6o78 (1926), P. S. C. No. 1698.
'li re Application of Charles Krona, A. D. 10941 (1925), P. S. C. No.
1521; West Ridge Transportation Co. v. Krona, C. D. 6153 (1925), P. S. C.
No. 1522; Application of F. W. Simpson, A. D. 681g (1922), VI Pa. P. S. C. R.
75. The Commission now ordinarily limits certificates for call and demand
service to the operation of vehicles which do not accommodate more than seven
passengers. Certificates issued without such limitation, however, may operate
buses of any size to furnish service. Fullington Auto Bus Co. v. Grazier, C. D.
6368 (1925), P. S. C. No. 1535. Group transportation was classified by the
Commission as "local group or party service" instead of "sightseeing service."
In re Application of Samuel .W. Eckroth, A. D. 12546 (925), P. S. C. No.
1582.
' Rule 6, RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 8o.
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dinarily such a renewal will be allowed where the applicant is able
and willing to continue service and has in the past rendered ade-
quate service in a lawful manner.87 Where, however, certificates
have been issued in the past without limitation in their terms for
a specified time, such certificates need not be renewed and are
effective until revoked for cause.
88
It is provided by the rules of the Commission that certificates
are non-transferable. Thus, where a partnership holding a certifi-
cate has dissolved, one of its members can not continue to operate
as a pattnership on the route covered. 9 An amendment of a cer-
tificate, however, may be allowed, so as to substitute the one mem-
ber for the partnership. It has allowed such an amendment upon
condition that the individual member file a bond and take out
indemnity insurance in his individual name 0
It is prescribed by Rule io of the General Rides and Regula-
tions that:
"The Commission will require all applicants and hold-
ers of certificates to show either financial responsibility or
the protection of liability and indemnity insurance, the
amount of insurance to be fixed in each case according to the
judgment of the Commission."
It may thus be seen that it will in each case exercise its judg-
ment as to whether insurance is necessary or not and the amount
needed. And in addition to this there is another regulatory re-
quirement, viz., that only motor vehicles licensed by the State
Highway Department and only drivers licensed by that depart-
ment shall be included in the certificate, 91 and that the license
number of vehicles be duly filed.92 It will, for failure of a motor
'In re Application of George R. Arner, A. D. 10797 (1925), P. S. C. No.
1511.
" Pittsburgh Trans. Co. et aL. v. American Taxi Cab Co. et al., C. D. 6468,
6469 (1925), P. S. C. No. 1588.
"Scranton, Montrose & Binghamton R. R. v. Trail Express Co., C. D. 5359
(1923), VI Pa. P. S. C. R. 150.
"P. S. C. v. Allen et al., C. D. 3172 (igx8), IV Pa. P. S. C. R. 477.
Rule 7, RUL.s AND RFGULATiONS, supra note 8o; Scranton R. R. v. Walsh,
supra note 13. Under Act of 1925, P. L. 254, PA. STAT. SurP. (1925) § 972, a
motor bus cannot be registered unless there is a subsisting certificate of the
Commission covering it.
'Rule 8, RULES AND RnGULATioNs, supra note 8o.
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carrier to obtain a certificate, certify this fact to the Secretary of
Highways with the request that the registration of the vehicles
and the operators' licenses be revoked.9 3  And if a carrier has
failed to have his vehicles properly registered,9 4 such fact will
also be certified to that official.
The Commission has prescribed that a certificate may be re-
voked by it at any time for violation of its rules or "for any fail-
ure to operate the said cars in a safe manner." 9- Thus, it will
revoke a certificate for operation contrary to the terms and con-
ditions of -the certificate.96 It will revoke a certificate for failure
to operate for an extended time, for example, nine months; 97 or
for violation of a rule of the Commission, such as that prohibiting
simulation of coloring of other cabs.9S A certificate has also been
revoked for failure of the holder to appear and offer testimony in
denial of allegations supporting a petition for revocation by a com-
peting transit company.9 9 Change of traffic conditions since the
issuance of certificate, so that operation is no longer necessary or
proper for service to the public, is also ground for revocation of an
outstanding certificate.' 00 A certificate, however, will not be re-
voked where the violation thereof or the violation of law relied on
"'Act of i919, P. L. 805, PA. STAT. (1920) §§ ioo2-IO94; Act of 1925, P.
L. 254 § 2; P. S. C. v. Krona, C. D. 65o6 (1925), P. S. C. No. 1583; P. S. C.
v. Connoro, C. D. 6539 (1926), P. S. C. No. 165o.
" This obligation to register motor cars applies equally to interstate car-
riers. P. S. C. v. Russo, C. D. 6o59 (1924), P. S. C. No. 1464.
"Rule 15, supra note 8o.
" McCormick v. John Louis, C. D. 6354 (1925), P. S. C. No. 1595.
"in re Application of Alfred B. Martin, A. D. iio78 (1925), P. S. C. No.
I63O. A certificate was issued to a taxicab company in I919 and did not limit
the exercise of rights thereunder for the two-year period, as is the present cus-
tom. The carrier ceased operating for four years, but its certificate was never
revoked. The Commission held that it would not, after the company had re-
sumed operation, revoke the certificate for the previous failure. Pittsburgh
Transp. Co. .et al. v. Americus Taxi Cab Co., supra note 88.
"Yellow Cab Co. v. Campbell, C. D. 6527 (1925), P. S. C. No. 1624. See
ruling of the Commission relative to simulating the color and design of cars of
special design or marking operating as taxicabs, February 7, 1922.
"lin re Application of Thomas Howard, A. D. 216 (1916), I1 Pa. P. S. C.
R. 89.
"°'Scranton R. R. v. Ownes, C. D. 442 (1915), H1 Pa. P. S. C. R. 269;
Scranton R. R. v. Wilson & Willfins, C. D. 443 (1915), II Pa. P. S. C. R.
270; In re Application of Diehl, A. D. 312 (1916), H1 Pa. P. S. C. R. 59I (Ap-
pealed to Superior Court and aff'd in Diehl v. P. S. C., 69 Pa. Super. 419
(9,8)).
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has been "innocent, non-intentional or in misapprehension of du-
ties imposed by the law." 101 And even if there are adequate
grounds for revocation of a certificate, it is discretionary with the
Commission whether it shall exercise its power. Where unusual
conditions, such as labor conditions, have affected the traffic, the
Commission has exercised its discretion and refused to revoke.3
0 2
And where the public will be inconvenienced by the revocation, it
has refused to revoke a certificate because of failure of the
operator to confine his actions to his authorized route.1
0 3
There are several methods of proceeding against a motor
carrier which is operating without a certificate. A carrier injuri-
ously affected by the unlawful operation may bring injunctive pro-
ceedings in a court to prohibit its operation, 10 4 or sue for damages
sustained.105 It may also apply to the Commission for a desisting
order,1 6 or an order imposing penalties. 107  In addition to this
the Commission may, of course, issue a desisting order of its own
motion.' 08 This order may be enforced either in court proceed-
ings by the Commission, 0 9 in proceedings by the attorney-gen-
eral, 10 or by action for penalties."' The Act also provides a pen-
"West. Penn. Rys. v. Capuzzi, C. D. 6676 (925), P. S. C. No. 1628; P.
S. C. v. Allen, supra note go; Lehigh Traction Co. v. Collins, C. D. i5gi (i918),
III Pa. P. S. C. R. i9I. It has been held that a certificate issued to a corpora-
tion will not be revoked because the stock of the 'corporation has been purchased
by a person who has violated a Commission order where it cannot be established
that the corporation iself is guilty. Pittsburgh Transfer Co. et aL v. Americus
Taxi Cab Co., supra note 88.
U2 Emerick Motor Bus Line Co. v. Bellefonte Central Transportation Co.,
C. D. 2711 (I918), IV Pa. P. S. C. R. 159.
"'Scranton Ry. v. Ownes, C. D. 6515 (1925), P. S. C. No. 1571.
Pa., N. J. Ry. v. Ellin, i D. & C. (Pa. 1922) i75.
"'P. S. C. Law, supra note io, Art. VI, § 40.
Scranton R. R. v. Walsh, supra note 13.
P. S. C. Law, Art. VI, §§ 36, 42, 43. See for example: Hagan, Inc.,
White Line Transfer & Taxicab Co. v. Coldren, C. D. 4671 (1922), V Pa. P. S.
C. P- 738.
P. S. C. Law, Art. VI, § 2.
Ibid. Art. VI, § 33.
'Ibid. Art. VI, § 34.
'I Ibid. Art. VI,§ 35. In cases where penalties have been imposed for viola-
tion of the Commission's General Order requiring buses to stop before crossing
tracks, see Lehigh Traction Co. v. Collins, C. D. 6o78 (1925), P. S. C. No.
x627; Pa. R. R. v. Fullington Autoi Bus Co., C. D. 6525 (1925), P. S. C. No.
1577. A penalty will not be imposed where an unlawful operation was under a
supposed right. Plank v. Gilbert, supra note 22.
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alty for false statements knowingly made in order to procure a
certificate.
1 12
Aside from the issuance of certificates, the commission has,
under the terms of the Public Service Company Law, general
regulative powers over motor carrier companies. By virtue of
this it has required that all holders of certificates file with it their
schedules of rates and charges in a manner prescribed; 113 and it
has, in some cases, exercised its power to fix rates. In Barber et
al. v. Drew," 4 it stated that it will not ordinarily value and fix the
rates of small motor carrier companies on the same basis as it
would the more pretentious utilities. In the same case, however,
it sustained a complaint against the increase of fares from five to
ten cents or three tickets for twenty-five cents, where it appeared
that under the five-cent fare the company was earning fifty per
cent. of its capital actually invested, after deduction of expenses,
and fifty per cent. of depreciation from its earnings. In one case,
the Commission fixed the rates for auto-bus service at ten cents
cash fare and four tickets for twenty-five cents." 5 In another it
permitted an auto-bus company operating at a loss to discontinue
weekly pass tickets which were less profitable than other forms of
tickets." 6  It has also assumed control over an attempted discon-
tinuance of a service by an auto-bus company, refusing to allow,
until after the trial period of newly increased rates, discontinuance
"'P. S. C. Law, Art. VI, § 38.
'Rule 14, supra note 8o. See also Rule 13 for posting of taxi rates inside
the bodies of the vehicles.
..C. D. 3124, 3143 (i9i8), IV Pa. P. S. C. R. 444-445. "It is not to be
presumed that the Commission will, or should, attempt to regulate small auto-
bus or other vehicular concerns under the same standards of valuation and rates
of return that apply to utilities in which capital in large amount is invested by
incorporated companies. Elements such as the employment of individual time
and talents in the development of such businesses, and which deserve reward
entirely apart from any measure of fixed return upon the meager amounts of
capital invested, must be considered if these small and worthy enterprises are to
be encouraged in giving the best possible public service. But it must also be
considered as in the respondent's case, that such utilities are given free, except-
ing only a few inconsequential local assessments or taxes, exclusive rights of way
over streets and highways maintained at public expense, and all the benefits of
police and other protection which the State and the local communities furnish."
'In re Drew, A. D. 43o5 (i92i), V Pa. P. S. C. R. 311.
. Schaeffer et a. v. Citizens' Transit Co., C. D. 6415 (1925), P. S. C. No.
1572.
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on the ground of unprofitable operation.1 17  And in addition it
has required the painting of the name of the company and the
number of certificate on the sides of vehicles,118 the reporting of
accidents,' 19 the equipment of taxicabs with taximeters and the
posting in the cab of a schedule of rates, °20 and the stopping of
motor carriers at crossings of highways with steam and electric
interurban railways.' 21
In order to obtain a certificate for the operation of a motor
carrier or for incorporation of such a company it is necessary to
make application to the Commission under the procedure set out
in the Act. Hearings must be held, notice given, and a written
finding made submitting its approval.12 2  Thereafter a certificate
of public convenience under seal of the Commission must issue
and a duplicate be duly filed among its records. 23  An applica-
tion for incorporation of a motor carrier company is a separate
proceeding from the application for authority to commence opera-
tion of such company, and the granting of a certificate to incor-
porate will not authorize operation in the territory covered by the
charter. A separate application for such permission must be
made.2 4 It has been pointed out above that a carrier is limited
to operation of the equipment specified in its certificate. In order
to operate additional cars, including substitution or replacement
'In re Application York Transit Co., A. D. 11352 (924), P. S. C. No.
1474.
Rule, 4, General Order No. 18, supra note 8o.
Rule ii, General Order No. 18, supra note 8o.
' Rules 12 and 13, General Order No. I8, supra note 8o.
General Order No. 24, requiring common carriers of passengers or prop-
erty of automobiles to come to a full stop before crossing the tracks of any
steam or electric interurban railway. Adopted February 14, 1922.
'An application for a certificate has been denied for failure to give notice
to competing carriers. Application of Mike Fazzone, A. D. 5982 (1922), V
Pa. P. S. C. R. 758.
P. S. C. Law, Art. VI, § ig. Where the Commission has granted a certifi-
cate to a motor carrier it may grant an application for a rehearing based on
failure of the certificate holder tc give proper notice, and may, where the evi-
dence on rehearing warrants, revoke the certificate. Diehl v. P. S. C., 69 Pa.
Super. 419 (i918). Where a complaint is filed against a motor carrier for opera-
tion without a certificate and thereafter the carrier applies for a certificate the
two cases are ordinarily held together. Allegheny Valley St. Ry. v. Peter Greel,
C. D. 64r, A. D. 416 (i9i6), II Pa. P. S. C. R. 646.
'Fagan et al. v. The Pittsburgh Transportation Co., C. D. 2849 (ig8),
III Pa. P. S. C. R. 65.
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thereof, it must apply to the Commission. Such application may
be made under the original application docket number by petition
verified by affidavit.1
2 5
The ordinary practice for the review of Commission find-
ings and orders applies in the case of orders involving motor car-
riers. It will be unnecessary herein to describe fully the pro-
cedure. 1 28 Suffice it to say that the court in reviewing the findings
of the Commission, as to public convenience in the issuance of a
certificate, will merely look to see if the judgment rests upon com-
petent and relevant evidence. It will not look to the expediency
or wisdom of the order nor will it weigh the evidence to deter-
mine if, on the testimony, it would make a similar ruling.1 2T The
burden of proof in reviewing the findings of the Commission is





Rule 2, General Order No. 18, supra note 8o.
P. S. C. Law, Art. VI.
Collins et at. v. P. S. C., 84 Pa. Super. 58 (1924) ; Gogaware v. P. S. C.,
83 Pa. Super. 269 (1924).
' Collins et al. v. P. S. C., .supra note 127.
